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AGENDA  
for  
NSC MEETING ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY

June 10, 1983

1. Introduction: Judge Clark
2. Nuclear weapons security at military sites: Secretary Weinberger
3. Status of DOE facility security: Secretary Hodel
4. Options for a White House focal point on nuclear weapons security. Discussion of the following options by NSC principals:
  - Presidential Commission as suggested by Senator Baker
  - Security czar reporting to the President or Judge Clark
  - Formation of a Senior Interagency Group - Security
  - NSC staff participation on steering group plus frequent status reports, annual briefing for President

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Declassify on: OADR

NSC review completed.

SECRET/SENSITIVEOptions for White House Focal Point on  
Nuclear Weapons Security

The President has decided that owing to the overriding importance of maintaining adequate physical security in the deployment, storage, and manufacture of nuclear weapons, a White House focal point for activities in this area will be established. This paper discusses several options for accomplishing this action.

Purpose

To establish a mechanism to provide continuing White House oversight of all matters pertaining to nuclear weapons security. This will include ensuring adequate progress in maintaining and improving security at domestic nuclear weapons production facilities, at nuclear weapons storage sites both in the U.S. and overseas, and in operational installations and commands of the Armed Forces.

Alternatives

Five are considered:

1. The appointment of a Presidential Commission on Nuclear Weapons Security.
2. The appointment of a distinguished individual reporting to the President.
3. The appointment of a distinguished individual reporting to the National Security Adviser.
4. The establishment of a Senior Interdepartmental Group chaired by the National Security Advisor.
5. The requirement of frequent status summaries, annual reports, and an annual briefing for the NSC, together with NSC staff participation in standing security steering groups.

1. Presidential Commission on Nuclear Weapons Security

This would be a small group of distinguished individuals reporting directly to the President.

Pro

- o Would provide highly visible proof of White House concern.

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Pro (continued)

- o Would bring fresh thinking to the nuclear weapons security problem.
- o Could cut across competing bureaucratic interests.

Con

- o Not suited for dealing with foreign governments to accelerate NATO site security upgrades.
- o Not well suited to managing details of implementation.
- o High visibility could unnecessarily alarm both US and European populace concerning nuclear weapon security.
- o Staff support needed must be supplied by White House.

2. Distinguished individual reporting directly to the President

This individual would be empowered to carry Presidential authority in dealing with Departments of the US Government and with foreign governments.

Pro

- o Would be very influential with governments, yet not so highly publicized as Alternative 1.
- o Could cut across competing bureaucratic interests.
- o Could urge acceleration on NATO governments at the highest level.

Con

- o Will raise antagonisms, be viewed as micro-management.
- o Staff support in White House required.
- o Would cut across State and Defense lines of responsibility in dealing with foreign governments.
- o Increased potential for raising public concern remains.

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## 3. Distinguished individual reporting to the National Security Advisor

This individual would carry the full authority of the National Security Adviser in dealing with US departments and foreign governments.

Pro

- o Would be very influential in urging actions upon US departments.
- o Not highly public.

Con

- o Not particularly influential in dealing with foreign governments.
- o Would cut across State and Defense lines of responsibility in any dealings with foreign governments.
- o Increased potential for raising public concern remains.

## 4. Establishment of an NSC-chaired SIG

This SIG would include the Deputy or Under Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy, and would be chaired by the National Security Advisor.

Pro

- o Would demonstrate high level of White House concern, yet include the Departments as full partners.
- o Relies on existing State and DOD means for overtures to NATO Allies.
- o Established forum for considering primary issues; therefore, no extraordinary visibility.

Con

- o SIG is not a full-time enterprise; not necessarily effective in accelerating existing activities.
- o Not always an effective means for cutting across bureaucratic concerns.
- o SIG poses additional burden for all agency staff.

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5. Require frequent status summaries for NSC staff review, annual reports and a briefing for the President, and direct NSC staff participation in security steering groups. This approach would supplement existing (annual) reporting requirements with quarterly progress reports focused only on areas of concern, such as (for example) NATO site security upgrades. As appropriate, State will also provide input for Defense progress reports.

In addition, the membership of the existing DOD-sponsored Worldwide Weapon Steering Group would be broadened to include representatives from State, DOE, and NSC. This group at the middle-management level deals directly and persistently with the implementation of nuclear weapons security policy and programs. A similar body is to be chartered to monitor security programs at domestic DOE facilities.

Pro

- o No public visibility--not in any way alarming.
- o Allows NSC staff to deal with security on a regular basis and call departures from planned program to attention of higher authority.
- o Facilitates and improves existing machinery both at the action and the executive level, and strengthens White House interface by mandating direct NSC participation.

Con

- o May be regarded by Congressional critics as inadequate because it creates no new senior oversight entity.